The main question F&S pose is whether "what and how we see is functionally independent from what and how we think, know, desire, act, etc." We synthesize a collection of concerns from an interdisciplinary set of co-authors regarding F&S's assumptions and appeals to intuition, resulting in their treatment of visual perception as context-free.
First, like F&S, Fodor (1983) famously used visual illusions to argue for the modularity of perceptual input systems. Cognition itself, Fodor suggested, was likely too complex to be modular. Ironically, F&S have turned Fodor's thesis on its head, and argue that perceptual input systems may interact as much as they like without violating modularity.
But there are some counterexamples. In Jastrow's (1899) and Hill's (1915) ambiguous figures, one sees either a duck or rabbit on the one hand, and either a young woman or old woman on the other. Yet, one can cognitively control which of these you see. Admittedly, cognition cannot "penetrate" our perception to turn straight lines into curved ones; and clearly we cannot see a young woman in the Jastrow figure. Nonetheless, cognition can change our interpretation of either figure.
Perhaps more compelling are auditory demonstrations of certain impoverished speech signals called sine-wave speech (e.g., Darwin, 1997; Remez, Pardo, Piorkowski & Rubin, 2001 ). Most of these stimuli sound like strangely squeaking wheels until one is told that they are speech. But sometimes the listener must be told what the utterances are. Then, quite spectacularly, the phenomenology is one of listening to a particular utterance of speech. Unlike the visual figures above, this is not a bistable phenomenon; once heard as speech one cannot fully go back and hear these signals as the squeaks one heard before. Is this not top-down?
Such phenomena -the bistability of certain visual figures and the asymmetric stability of these speech-like sounds, among many others -are not the results of confirmatory research. They are indeed the "amazing demonstrations" that F&S cry out for.
Secondly, visual neuroscience shows numerous examples of feedback projections to visual cortex, and feedback influences on visual neural processing ignored by F&S. The primary visual cortex (V1) receives descending projections from a wide range of cortical areas. Although the strongest feedback signals come from nearby visual areas, V3 and V4, V1 also receives feedback signals from V5/MT, parahippocampal regions, superior temporal parietal regions, auditory cortex (Clavignier, Falchier, & Kennedy, 2004 ) and the amygdala (Amaral, Behniea, & Kelly, 2003) , establishing that the brain shows pervasive top-down connectivity. The next step is to determine what perceptual function descending projections serve. F&S cite a single paper to justify ignoring a massive literature accomplishing this (p. 9).
Neurons in V1 exhibit differential responses to the same visual input under a variety of contextual modulations (e.g., David, Vinje, & Gallant, 2004; Hupé et al. 1998; Kapadia, Ito, Gilbert, & Westheimer, 1995; Motter, 1993) . Numerous studies with adults have established that selective attention enhances processing of information at the attended location, and suppresses distraction (Gandhi, Heeger, & Boynton, 1999; Kastner, Pinsk, De Weerd, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1999; Markant, Worden, & Amso, 2015; Slotnick, Schwarzbach, & Yantis, 2003) . This excitation/suppression mechanism improves the quality of early vision, enhancing contrast sensitivity, acuity, d-prime, and visual processing of attended information (Anton-Erxleben & Carrasco, 2013; Carrasco, 2011; Lupyan & Spivey, 2010; Zhang et al., 2011) . This modulation of visual processing in turn supports improved encoding and recognition for attended information among adults (Rutman, Clapp, Chadick, & Gazzaley, 2010; Uncapher & Rugg, 2009; Zanto & Gazzaley, 2009 ) and infants (Markant & Amso, 2013 Markant, Oakes & Amso, 2015) . Recent data indicate that attentional biases can function at higher levels in the cognitive hierarchy (Chua & Gautier, 2015) , indicating that attention can serve as a mechanism guiding vision based on category-level biases.
Results like these have spurred the visual neuroscience community to develop new theories to account for how feedback projections change the receptive field properties of neurons throughout visual cortex (Dayan, Hinton, Neal & Zemel, 1995; Friston, 2010; Gregory, 1980; Jordan, 2013; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2001; Kveraga, Ghuman, & Bar, 2007; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Spratling, 2010) . It is not clear how F&S's theory of visual perception can claim that recognition of visual input takes place without top-down influences, when the activity of neurons in the primary visual cortex is routinely modulated by contextual feedback signals from downstream cortical subsystems. The role of downstream projections is still under investigation, but theories of visual perception and experience ought to participate in understanding them, rather than ignoring them.
F&S are incorrect when they conclude that it is "eminently plausible that there are no top-down effects of cognition on perception." Indeed, F&S's argument is heavily recycled from a previous BBS contribution (Pylyshyn, 1999) . Despite their attempt to distinguish their contribution from this one, it suffers from very similar weaknesses identified by past commentary (e.g., Bruce, Langton, & Hill, 1999; Bullier, 1999; Cavanagh, 1999; among others) . F&S are correct when they state early on that, "discovery of substantive top-down effects of cognition on perception would revolutionize our understanding of how the mind is organized." Especially in the case of visual perception, that is exactly what has been happening in the field for these past few decades.
